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Abstract. Using comparative methods of  policy analysis, this paper explores the institutional 
factors shaping the transfer and adaptation of  risk-based approaches to regulation within 
and between the regimes for occupational health and safety (OHS) and food safety in the 
UK. Over the past two decades successive governments have enthusiastically promoted 
risk as a key concept for regulatory reform and ‘better regulation’. Rather than trying 
to prevent all possible harms, ‘risk-based’ approaches promise to make regulation more 
proportionate and effective by using various risk-based metrics and policy instruments to 
focus regulatory standard-setting and enforcement activity on the highest priority risks, 
as determined through formal assessments of  their probability and consequences. But 
despite facing similar external pressures and sharing many historical and structural features 
as OHS, food safety regulation has proven much less receptive to risk-based reforms of  
its organizing principles and practices. To explain that anomaly, we consider a range 
of  explanations highlighted in the policy transfer and mobilities literatures. We find that 
coercive drivers for the adoption of  risk, in the form of  top-down political pressure for 
deregulation or hard EU mandates, are much less influential than voluntary ones, which 
reflect both normative (ie, shared commitments to proportionality, resource prioritization, 
and blame deflection) and mimetic (ie, imitation of  private sector corporate governance 
models) isomorphism. We conclude with wider reflections about the significance of  our 
cases for policy transfer and mobilities research and for the limits to risk as a universal 
principle for organizing, and accounting for, governance activity.
Keywords: risk governance, policy mobilities, food safety, occupational health and safety, 
risk-based regulation
1 Introduction
This paper explores the institutional geographies shaping the development, transfer, 
and adaptation of what has become known as ‘risk-based’ regulation. Rather than trying 
to prevent all possible harms, risk-based approaches seek only to limit those that exceed 
acceptable levels of risk, as determined through formal assessments of their probability and 
consequences (OECD, 2010). To that end, risk-based principles and policy instruments can 
be used to focus not just the goals of regulation, but also related inspection and enforcement 
practices, on the highest priority risks.
Over the last two decades, successive UK governments have enthusiastically promoted 
risk as a key concept for regulatory reform and ‘better regulation’ (BRC, 2006; Cabinet 
Office, 2002). One of the Blair government’s signature acts was to reorganize banking 
regulation on explicitly risk-based principles, while the Treasury-sponsored Hampton (2005) 
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Review of Administrative Burdens on Business led the subsequent Brown government to 
make it a statutory requirement for all regulatory reporting, inspection, and enforcement 
activity across all policy domains be prioritized according to risk (BERR, 2007). Announcing 
these reforms, Gordon Brown explained how the discriminating logic of risk would radically 
reform the practice of, and even the need for, regulation by
 “moving away from the old blanket approach, of 100% form-filling and 100% inspection 
that is inefficient and wasteful of your time, to a new approach based on risk … . And I 
believe, too, we should consider how we can continue to extend our risk-based approach, 
applying the concept of risk not just to the enforcement of regulation, but also to the 
design and indeed to the decision as to whether to regulate at all” (Brown, 2006).
The current Coalition government is also committed—rhetorically at least—to risk-based 
regulation. Its Programme for Government pledged to reform occupational health and safety 
(OHS), so as to “end the culture of ‘tick-box’ regulation, and instead target inspections on 
high-risk organisations”, and, in the food domain, to reduce “the regulatory burden on farmers 
by moving to a risk-based system of regulation” (HM Government, 2010, pages 9, 17).
In this paper we examine the cases of food safety and OHS regulation because they 
have been the key testing grounds for developing risk-based regulation in the UK. Hampton 
(2005) singled out their risk-based approaches to regulatory inspection and enforcement as 
exemplars of best practice, which were subsequently generalized to all regulators through 
the statutory Regulators’ Compliance Code (BERR, 2007). The goals of these two regimes, 
however, remain strikingly different. Since the 1970s the goal of OHS regulation has been 
to strike an acceptable balance between the risks of workplace injury and the costs, time, 
and effort required to reduce them further. Workplace accidents, even deaths, are legally 
acceptable as long as reasonable measures to manage health and safety risks are taken. By 
contrast, food safety regulation has resisted such a risk-based goal. For almost 150 years 
businesses have faced an absolute legal duty to ensure that the food they sell is ‘not injurious 
to health’.
This contrast is puzzling because, as we explain in the paper, these two regulatory 
regimes face common pressures that might lead us to expect them to mobilize risk-based 
policy instruments in similar ways. Through both statutory duties and concerted political 
pressure, central government has required regulators in both domains to demonstrate their 
risk-based credentials. Both regimes regulate large sectors of the economy and powerful 
private interests might also be expected to lobby for risk-based approaches as a way of 
reducing their regulatory burdens (Dodds, 2006). The vast scope of the food safety and OHS 
domains also challenges regulatory oversight and makes risk-based approaches attractive to 
regulators to help them rationalize and allocate their scarce resources.
In addition to these common pressures, the two regimes also share an intertwined 
institutional history that might be expected to facilitate transfers of risk-based regulatory 
reforms between them. The word and concepts of ‘risk’ have long been associated with OHS 
and food safety; both regimes having emerged out of Victorian responses to market failures 
to prevent significant illnesses, injuries, and deaths. Moreover, the regimes for regulating 
these domains share personnel, and this has encouraged the transfer of organizational models 
and enforcement principles between them.
The aim of this paper is to explain why food safety regulation has proved less receptive 
to transfers of risk-based principles and policy instruments than OHS. In so doing, we also 
address academic debates within political science, sociology, and geography about the factors 
shaping exchanges of ideas, instruments, and administrative arrangements between policy 
domains and jurisdictions. After reviewing that literature, we describe the extent to which 
the regulatory goals and enforcement practices of UK OHS and food safety regulation have 
become risk based. We then use those contrasting patterns to test different explanatory theories 
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of policy change circulating in the policy transfer and mobilities literatures, focusing on: path 
dependencies and policy windows; power of organized interest groups; Europeanization; 
and bureaucratic proclivities. We conclude with broader reflections on the policy transfer and 
mobilities literatures and on the institutional drivers of risk-based regulation.
2 Policy transfers, convergence and mobilities
Recent years have seen renewed academic interest in the processes by which policy ideas, 
instruments, and institutional arrangements from one jurisdiction are reproduced, reworked, 
or rejected in others (Benson and Jordan, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2013; Peck, 2011). Within 
political science much of the early work charted spatial and temporal patterns in the diffusion 
of policy innovations among US states and cities (Walker, 1969). Subsequent work on when, 
how, and why policy makers draw lessons from policy making elsewhere (eg, Rose, 1993) 
was informed by many of the same normative ideals of rational, utility-maximizing policy 
upheld by advocates of risk-based regulation (eg, Breyer, 1993). That research, however, was 
criticized for ignoring the role of historical path dependencies (de Jong, 2009) and coercive 
pressures in limiting the scope for rational policy optimization (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).
In contrast to the avowed positivism of the lesson-learning approach, Dolowitz and 
Marsh (1996; 2000) subsumed policy diffusion and lesson drawing within a broader frame of 
so-called ‘policy transfer’, which acknowledged that policy framings are socially constructed 
and contestable. They identified a number of analytical variables to classify and explain 
the success or failure of policy transfer processes, such as the drivers (ie, voluntary versus 
coercive) and actors involved, the things being transferred, the sources being drawn upon, and 
the degree to which policies are replicated in different contexts. Empirically, policy transfer 
research has tended to concentrate on “peer-to-peer transfer between national governments” 
(Benson and Jordan, 2011, page 373), with a major focus on the agents of policy diffusion 
such as think tanks and private sector consultants (Stone, 2000). Another concern has been 
the role of international governance structures, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(Gruszczynski, 2010), in promoting or mandating the adoption of policy measures developed 
elsewhere. Recent research on Europeanization has gone beyond Dolowitz and Marsh’s 
simple opposition of voluntary and coercive mechanisms by focusing on the dynamics of 
‘downloading’ EU requirements into national law and ‘uploading’ by different actors seeking 
to shape EU requirements in the image of existing national arrangements (Connolly, 2008).
In contrast to this work on the processes of exogenously transferring policies from 
one context to another, organizational sociologists look to institutional ‘fit’ to explain the 
endogenous tendency for institutions to adopt similar forms and practices over time. DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1983) influential model distinguished between normative, coercive, and mimetic 
drivers of institutional isomorphism. In the case of risk-based regulation, normative drivers 
might include beliefs that risk-based approaches improve the transparency, effectiveness, and 
economic efficiency of regulatory activity (Cabinet Office, 2002; OECD, 2010). Coercive 
drivers for the adoption of risk might include the statutory UK Regulator’s Compliance Code 
(BERR, 2007) or EU and WTO requirements for risk assessment, as well as soft power 
drivers, such as business lobbying and neoliberal pressures to lighten regulatory burdens. 
Finally, mimetic drivers might encompass how public sector organizations ape corporate 
governance fashions by reframing the inevitable and increasingly auditable challenges of 
organizational life as ‘risks’ that they should not be blamed for failing to prevent (Huber and 
Rothstein, 2013).
In a somewhat stylized distinction from those research traditions, geographers have begun 
exploring what they call ‘policy mobilities’ (eg, McCann, 2011; Peck, 2011), which they 
distinguish from policy transfer in three ways. First, echoing a wider mobilities literature in 
sociology and geography (Sheller and Urry, 2006), geographers emphasize “the social and 
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spatial complexity of movements of all sorts”, in contrast to policy transfer’s focus on the 
diffusion of stable policy-packages between fixed jurisdictional levels of nationally bounded 
states according to the optimizing calculations of individual policy makers (McCann and 
Ward, 2013, page 7). Second, the policy mobilities approach focuses on the scalar and spatial 
relations through which policy arrangements are put into motion and remade as a result. 
Third, in contrast to the “implicit literalness” of policy transfer research, “which tends to 
suggest the importation of fully formed, off-the-shelf policies” (Peck and Theodore, 2001, 
page 449), geographers also emphasize the mutability of policy ideas and instruments on 
the move.
From this perspective, policies are regarded as “assemblages of parts of the near and 
far, of fixed and mobile pieces of expertise, regulation, institutional capacities, etc. that are 
brought together in particular ways and for particular interests and purposes” (McCann and 
Ward, 2012, page 328). Some of these claims, particularly about the messiness of policy 
transfer (de Jong, 2009) and the need to “problematize the division between the domestic 
and the international” (Stone, 1999, page 53), have also been made within the policy transfer 
literature. In that sense, the distinctions sometimes drawn between ‘policy transfer’ and 
‘policy mobilities’ represent disciplinary boundary-work as much as substantive disputes 
about the nature of the policy processes being studied.
Perhaps the most important contrast is methodological orientation. Disciplinary traditions 
in political science tend to emphasize building explanatory models. Indeed, Dolowitz and 
Marsh’s policy transfer model has been criticized for being insufficiently explanatory 
because it “does not adequately separate the policy ‘success’ or ‘failure’ being explained 
from the processes of ‘policy transfer’ ” being invoked to explain them (James and Lodge, 
2003, page 190). By contrast, advocates of the policy mobilities approach are sceptical of 
models, because they often get “reified, becoming the objects of debate rather than facilitating 
analyses of the social processes that constitute policy transfer” (McCann, 2011, page 111). 
Their preferred “methodological approach is largely qualitative and ethnographic”, typically 
involving “deep studies” of individual cases (McCann and Ward, 2013, page 10). Yet 
without careful attention to what such cases are cases of, even the ‘distended’ case-study 
methods recommended for tracing policy mobilities “through globalizing networks and 
across translocal settings” (Peck and Theodore, 2012, page 21), will struggle to generalize 
beyond the rather unsatisfying conclusion that “context matters” (Peck, 2011, page 775). 
Clearly context does matter, but understanding how and why it matters requires some kind of 
explanatory framework “to identify whether the commonalities between cases are sufficiently 
strong to warrant seeing them as variations on a theme” (Castree, 2005, page 543).
In response to that challenge we use a comparative case-study methodology focused on 
regulatory regimes, by which we mean the institutional geographies, rules, practices, and 
animating ideas that are associated with the regulation of particular problems (Hood et al, 
2001). That mesolevel analysis is pitched between macrolevel social theoretic explanations 
of policy change that, for example, emphasize the global forces of neoliberalism, and 
microlevel descriptions of particular policy settings. By comparing the evolution of two 
regulatory regimes in a single country, we can exclude variables that have been identified 
as important in shaping the international proliferation of risk-based regulation, such as legal 
culture, national policy style, and political system (Rothstein et al, 2013). In so doing, we can 
explore the relative importance of various nationally specific factors influencing the transfer 
and adaptation of risk-based approaches within and between different policy domains in a 
single polity.
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3 Mapping the OHS and food safety regimes
We now compare the regimes for OHS and food safety regulation, focusing on interrelated 
but distinct aspects of regulatory practice that can each be subject to risk-based reforms. First, 
we examine the extent to which the principles underlying regulatory goal-setting have been 
defined in terms of risk, such as regulating chemicals based on acceptable probabilities of 
contracting cancer, rather than seeking to eliminate all carcinogens. Second, we look at the 
extent to which regulatory inspection and enforcement involve risk-based practices, such 
as targeting enforcement activity on the riskiest premises according to the likelihood and 
consequence of their noncompliance.
Our analysis draws on policy document analysis, supplemented by a well-developed 
academic literature on the two domains (Hawkins, 2002; Howard, 2004; Hutter, 2011; 
Rothstein, 2013; Tombs and Whyte, 2010; 2013; Walters et al, 2011). One author (Howard) 
is also a chartered environmental health practitioner with more than twenty-five years 
professional experience of food safety and OHS regulation. Moreover, we draw on some 
twenty interviews with OHS and food safety regulators.
3.1 OHS
OHS regulation in the UK dates back to the mid-19th century. Under the common law, 
employers were not liable for workplace accidents, on the presumption that the potential for 
harm was reflected in the wage negotiated by the worker. However, worker protest led to 
the Factory Acts, which progressively introduced safety rules for various industries, created 
a very small factory inspectorate, and established an employers’ duty of care to employees 
(Hennock, 2007).
Over the next century OHS regulation grew incrementally through the ad hoc accretion 
of sector-specific statutes containing detailed rules that addressed an ever-accumulating 
list of workplace hazards. By the 1960s, however, there was growing dissatisfaction with this 
piecemeal approach. Critics complained that “the sheer mass of this law, far from advancing 
the cause of safety and health” led to inflexible safety ‘standards’ and inconsistent levels of 
protection (Robens, 1972, paragraph 28). For example, powered woodworking saws required 
multiple guards, even if they were museum exhibits operated in fenced-off areas, while 
inspectors could not go beyond regulatory requirements to demand the total containment 
of mechanically fed factory sawing machines, even if this significantly increased safety for 
only a small cost. This rules-based approach also left millions of workers unprotected in 
sectors that were still unregulated, where there were regulatory gaps, or where technological 
development had outpaced regulatory requirements (eg, Robens, 1972, paragraph 458).
In the face of such problems, a landmark review of OHS regulation by the chair of the 
National Coal Board, Lord Robens (1972) led to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974 (HSWA 1974), which fundamentally transformed the institutional structure and legal 
principles for OHS regulation. The act consolidated the various specialist inspectorates within 
a new powerful regulatory agency, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), overseen by a 
commission organized along corporatist lines with tripartite representation from government, 
business, and unions. The act also transformed the legal landscape, replacing the patchwork 
of prescriptive rules with a ‘principles-based’ approach that required employers to ensure 
only so far as is reasonably practicable (‘SFAIRP’) the health and safety of their employees. 
The term reasonably practicable was already established in mining case law, as meaning the 
cost and effort required to reduce risk should not be ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the benefit 
gained [Edwards v. National Coal Board (NCB), [1949] 1 All ER 743]. In that case, a miner 
was killed by a collapsing mine roadway, but the Court of Appeal ruled that it would have 
been unreasonably expensive for the NCB to shore up all roadways. The act generalized this 
principle of balancing risk, cost, and benefit to all workplaces and gave it force by creating 
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a criminal offence of exposing workers to an unreasonable level of risk from any hazard, 
whether or not anyone was actually harmed. By requiring employers to consider both the 
likelihood and the consequences of workplace harms, SFAIRP established, in principle, if not 
yet in name, a risk-based approach to regulatory goal-setting.
This risk-based calculus was made more explicit by the HSE (1988) when it elaborated its 
Tolerability of Risk framework to explain to the Public Inquiry into the Sizewell B Nuclear 
Power Station how it made trade-offs between risk, cost, and benefit. Since then, the risk-based 
principles underpinning OHS regulation have proved remarkably resilient, despite crises 
such as the Piper Alpha disaster that killed 167 oil workers, and an EU Framework Directive 
(89/391/EEC) which implied that workplace hazards should be eliminated regardless of cost. 
Indeed, the HSE (2013) has been heavily involved in central government initiatives since the 
1990s to transfer risk-based regulatory approaches to other policy domains in the UK.
Regulatory inspection to enforce risk-based OHS goals requires considerable expertise. 
Rather than simply measuring performance against prescriptive rules, inspectors must be 
able to judge the adequacy of employers’ risk assessments of what is reasonably practicable. 
These duties are shared by expert inspectors, often with advanced degrees, employed by 
the HSE and local authorities (LAs), with the former inspecting industrial and public sector 
premises, and the latter inspecting other commercial and service-sector premises (Walters 
et al, 2011). At the instigation of Robens (1972, paragraph 218), both use a sophisticated risk-
based priority-planning system to make routine inspection frequency dependent on scores for 
the likelihood and consequences of noncompliance (Walters et al, 2011).
Risk also guides the response to violations. In calling for enforcement sanctions to be 
“proportionate” and reflect “the risks to people arising from the breach” HSE (2009, page 4), 
guidance now formalizes the long-standing practice of inspectors taking account of likelihood 
and consequence of noncompliance in deciding upon enforcement action (Hawkins, 2002), 
which can range from offering advice to criminal prosecution. In principle, the HSWA 1974 
requires the courts to decide culpability based on the ex ante principle of SFAIRP, although 
there is some evidence that in practice the courts are more likely to find defendants culpable 
and to assign larger penalties when harm has actually occurred (Barber, 2002).
3.2 Food safety
As with OHS, the language of risk is now ubiquitous in food policy debates. Risk assessment 
requirements have been institutionalized in international regulatory regimes, such as that 
of the EU and WTO (Gruszczynski, 2010). Indeed, the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) 
explicitly advocates the application of risk-based approaches to regulation, stating, “We aim 
always to be risk-based and proportionate … . We recognise there is no such thing as zero 
risk, and aim to reduce risk to the level that would be acceptable to the ordinary consumer” 
(FSA, 2006, paragraph 2.35).
Despite this commitment, however, the extent to which the goal of food safety regulation 
can be risk-based is constrained by the long-standing legal principle that food cannot be 
sold that is “injurious to health” or otherwise “unfit for human consumption” [Food Safety 
Act 1990, (s)8.2]. In this context, the FSA (2011, page 6) describes itself as “the national 
authority responsible for ensuring your food is safe to eat” (emphasis added). To that end, 
the purpose of risk assessment is not to specify acceptable levels of risk, but to identify any 
potential health hazards to humans that could make food unsafe. There is no equivalent in 
food law to the SFAIRP qualification of safety in OHS. Instead there is strict liability for 
selling unsafe food; defendants must prove either that offences were “due to fault of another 
person” or that they “carried out all such checks of the food in question as were reasonable 
in all the circumstances” to ensure that all food they sell is safe [Food Safety Act 1990, 
(s)20,21.3]. Unlike SFAIRP, the reasonableness criteria demanded by such due diligence do 
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not balance the costs of added safety checks against the benefits of making food safer. Food 
safety duties are absolute.
The origin of this distinctive approach dates back to the 19th century, when popular 
outrage over food adulteration, such as the thinning of flour with white lead, led to the 
introduction of basic food legislation. The requirement to ensure that food for sale is not 
‘injurious to health’ first appeared in the Adulteration of Food and Drugs Act 1872, was 
repeated in all subsequent UK legislation right up to the current Food Safety Act 1990, and 
has been reinforced by EU mandates that “food shall not be placed on the market if it is 
unsafe” [Regulation (EC)178/2002, section 14]. EU law demands not just clean premises and 
appropriate food handling and storage, but also the use of the Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Points (HACCP) food management system to address each potential hazard critical 
to food safety (Directive 93/43/EEC). While some commentators describe HACCP as a 
risk-based system (Hutter, 2011), its purpose is to eliminate hazards “in order to guarantee 
safety” (European Commission, 2009); it does not prioritize control measures based on the 
likelihood and consequence of exposure to hazards or balance the risks, costs, and benefits 
of control measures. Indeed, the safety focus of HACCP is best illustrated by its original 
development by NASA to ensure that astronauts were not poisoned by the ready-meals they 
took into space.
This continuity in the basic legal principles of food safety regulation is remarkable 
considering the very substantial changes in its institutional architecture. Throughout the 
20th century, food safety policy-making responsibilities were shared between the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and the Department of Health. In the 1990s, 
however, a series of food scandals, most notably BSE, mired MAFF in crisis. In 2000 the 
Blair government abolished MAFF and, following the recommendation of the James (1997) 
Report, established the FSA as an independent nonministerial government department to take 
sole responsibility for food safety policy. Moreover, in recent decades the EU has steadily 
expanded its writ over food safety through numerous Directives and Regulations and, in 
2002, creating the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) with EU-wide responsibilities 
for risk assessment and communication.
Although the James Report recommended that the FSA should be modelled on the HSE, 
the FSA differs in three principal ways. First, unlike the HSE, the FSA’s creation was not 
accompanied by any change in the goals of food safety law. Second, the FSA was not founded 
as a powerful corporatist agency overseen by board members sitting as representatives of 
particular groups, but was founded as a weaker public body governed by a board of publicly 
appointed individuals selected to provide “a variety of skills and experience … in matters 
related to food safety or interests of consumers” [Food Standards Act 1999, (s)2.2]. Third, 
other than the inspection of slaughterhouses and slaughtered animals, the FSA has been given 
only limited powers over food safety inspection and enforcement; regulatory functions which 
have historically rested with LA environmental health departments alongside their OHS 
inspection and enforcement duties.
While the formal goal of food safety regulation is ensuring safety rather than acceptable 
risk, regulatory inspection and enforcement have become more risk-based. Starting in the late 
1980s, LAs began adapting the OHS priority-planning system to organize inspections for the 
hundreds of thousands of food premises under their jurisdiction. That approach was reinforced 
by European Regulation 882/2004, which requires official controls, such as inspection, to be 
“carried out regularly, on a risk basis” (article 3). In responding to violations, inspectors 
have traditionally exercised discretion by varying sanctions according to their judgments 
of the likelihood and consequences of noncompliance, with closure notices and criminal 
prosecutions reserved for the most serious violations (Howard, 2004). That approach has 
been formalized by FSA (2012a) guidance and Crown Prosecution Service requirements to 
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consider the “seriousness of the offence … and the harm to the victim” in deciding whether 
to proceed to court (CPS, 2013, page 8).
While the FSA (2012a, page 4) has formally endorsed a “risk-based and proportionate” 
approach to inspection and enforcement, its own meat hygiene inspections remain largely 
hazard-based. Rather than varying the degree of scrutiny according to the probability and 
consequences of harm to human health, every single carcass is inspected by a meat hygiene 
inspector under the supervision of a certified veterinarian, following a detailed, half-century 
old, protocol to detect a range of animal diseases, many of which are now rare or of little 
human health significance (FSA, 2009). EFSA (2013), with FSA support, has advocated 
a more risk-based approach to meat hygiene, but, while rules have been agreed on pigs 
[Regulation (EU) 219/2014], agreement has yet to be reached on other animals.
4 Accounting for risk in OHS and food safety regulation
As we have shown, the OHS and food safety regulatory regimes have faced common 
pressures to adopt risk-based approaches. Yet, despite sharing a number of features that might 
be receptive to such transfers, food safety regulation has proved more resistant to risk-based 
reforms than OHS (see table 1). Most notably, while the risk-based legal goal of SFAIRP was 
established in OHS in the mid-1970s, when there was little precedent or political pressure 
for such approaches, food safety regulation is still premised on ensuring safe food, despite 
being reformed a quarter of a century later when risk-based approaches to regulatory reform 
were in vogue and there was stronger normative and coercive pressure to adopt risk as an 
organizing principle for regulatory goal-setting.
There has, however, been more convergence towards risk as an underlying principle 
for regulatory inspection and enforcement activity. Both OHS and food safety inspection 
employ a priority-planning scheme for organizing inspection frequency according to risk, 
and inspectors in both domains calibrate enforcement sanctions according to the risks posed 
by violations. Yet, despite the FSA’s (2012a) commitment to risk-based inspection, its own 
meat inspectors inspect all carcasses according to an outdated checklist of hazards, many of 
which are now rare and of little significance for human health.
Table 1. Principles and practices of occupational health and safety (OHS) and food safety regulation 
in the UK.
OHS Food
Regulatory goals
Risk-based: SFAIRP (so far as is reasonably 
practicable)
Safety: ‘not injurious to health’
Regulatory inspection
Risk-based: Health and Safety Executive and 
local authority inspections priority-planned by 
probability and consequence of noncompliance, 
with enforcement sanctions used in proportion 
to risk.
Partly risk-based: LA inspections 
priority-planned, but meat inspection follows 
strict checklist of hazards. Sanctions for 
noncompliance proportional to the risks they 
pose
Regulatory enforcement
Partly risk-based: Prosecutions based on risk-
based principles of proportionality and ex ante 
foreseeability, but judges and juries sometimes 
swayed by degree of harm ex post.
Strict liability: defendants must prove they 
exercised all due diligence to avoid violations.
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In the following subsection we try to explain these uneven patterns in the adoption of 
risk ideas, by considering a range of explanations for policy change highlighted in the policy 
transfer and mobilities literatures.
4.1 Path dependency, policy windows, and transfer failure
One conventional explanation for the uneven spread of risk-based regulation would point to 
local context and historical path dependencies. Historical institutionalists often emphasize 
the high costs of departing from the status quo to explain limited transfer of policy ideas from 
one domain to another (Thelen, 1999), while the policy mobilities approach “call[s] attention 
to the constitutive role of geographical context” in shaping policy outcomes (Peck, 2011, 
page 780). Others, however, point to the importance of crises for opening ‘policy windows’ 
for change (Kingdon, 1984). Such approaches might explain the differing extent to which 
risk-based ideas of regulatory reform have taken hold in OHS and food safety.
In the case of OHS, the mass of prescriptive, sector-specific law that had accumulated 
since the 19th century created strong path dependencies favouring incrementalism and policy 
layering. By the late 1960s, however, it was widely recognised that the resulting piecemeal 
and prescriptive approach undermined the effectiveness of OHS regulation. In that context, 
Robens was a classic ‘policy entrepreneur’ who drew on his mining background to exploit 
a ‘policy window’ opened by his review of OHS to suggest sweeping regulatory reforms 
fitting the political mood of the day. Robens’s idea for consolidating regulatory inspection 
and policy making in a new national agency built on tripartite foundations reflected his role 
as chairman of the UK’s then major nationalized industry and fitted with the corporatist 
ideologies of successive Labour (1964–70; 1974–76) and Conservative (1970–74) 
governments. Likewise, Robens also drew on mining case law as the legal precedent for a 
new principles-based approach to regulation based on SFAIRP, which the HSWA 1974 made 
the basis for regulating all workplaces.
In this highly corporatist and state-centred context, therefore, the rise of risk as a 
principle of regulatory reform in OHS cannot be attributed to neoliberalization as some 
suggest (Gray, 2009; Tombs and Whyte, 2010; 2013). Rather, its emergence was linked to a 
particular institutional context and history, in which Robens was able to turn a ready-made 
sector-specific solution into a universal principle for all workplace situations.
With BSE, food safety regulation had its own policy window for changing the 19th-century 
goal of ensuring food is ‘not injurious to health’. In his official inquiry into the crisis, Lord 
Phillips (Phillips et al, 2000, paragraph 1293) stated that “The Government does not set out 
to achieve zero risk, but to reduce risk to a level which should be acceptable to the reasonable 
consumer.” This emphasis on qualifying the goal of safety with risk chimed with central 
government rhetoric about proportionality and better regulation (Cabinet Office, 2002; 
HSE, 2013). Asked to review existing regulatory arrangements, the James (1997) Report 
recommended creating a new food safety agency following the model of the HSE.
Yet the creation of the FSA did not displace the regime’s long-standing legal goal, which 
James accepted without question. Indeed, his report barely mentions the word ‘risk’. His 
diagnosis of the BSE crisis focused on organizational failings of the regulatory regime: 
namely MAFF’s conflicting responsibilities to promote agrifood business and protect 
consumers; poor coordination amongst regulatory actors; and nationally uneven enforcement 
practices. Given that diagnosis, James sought only to transfer the organizational structure of 
the HSE into food safety, rather than its risk-based approach to OHS regulation. Risk ideas, 
therefore, played little role in the reform of food safety regulation, despite their national 
and international promotion as prerequisites for good governance and regulatory efficiency 
(BRC, 2006; Cabinet Office, 2002; HSE, 2013). Consequently, the FSA found itself caught in 
a contradictory situation; on the one hand it aspired to be ‘risk-based’, but on the other it has 
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to act within a legal framework that committed it to “ensuring … food is safe to eat” (FSA, 
2011, page 6).
4.2 Organized interest groups
Another influential explanation for policy transfer outcomes is the power of organized interest 
groups in driving or resisting risk-based reforms. Tombs and Whyte (2013), for example, 
argue that risk-based regulatory reforms to OHS have served the deregulatory interests of big 
business. A number of scholars have similarly highlighted the negative influence of major 
agribusiness interests on food safety regulation (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2005). But 
such explanations sometimes overlook the importance of interest group configuration and 
mobilization in shaping the institutional geographies of regulation.
The politics of OHS is principally shaped by the relatively narrow sectoral concerns of 
labour and business stakeholders, who share an interest in striking trade-offs between profits, 
job security and safety. Fairman (2007) has argued that the HSE’s risk-based approach to 
negotiating and rationalizing such trade-offs is facilitated by its corporatist setting in which 
business and labour representatives can successfully command support from the organized 
constituencies they represent. This was evident in 2011, for example, when union and business 
representatives were panel members of the government-commissioned Lofstedt (2011) 
Review of Health and Safety Regulation and agreed to strengthen the regime’s risk-based 
principles.
Support from organized labour and business has helped sustain the OHS regime in the 
face of various public and political pressures to reform its basic principles. In the aftermath of 
disasters, victims’ groups often grab the headlines to demand stricter rules, while the political 
right regularly draws on often fictitious accounts of disproportionate OHS regulation as 
symptomatic of an overbearing ‘nanny state’. Yet repeated efforts to deregulate OHS by senior 
Conservative ministers in the current government have been rebutted by official independent 
reviews that have found “overwhelming” evidence that business and labour representatives 
consider the risk-based “regulatory framework established by the … [HSWA] 1974 remained 
relevant and was still necessary” (Temple, 2014, page 5).
By contrast, the politics of food safety is more complex than OHS, reflecting the multiple 
and often conflicting interests of the general public and a plethora of public, professional, and 
private interest groups across the food supply chain. Unlike OHS, market pressures have 
largely worked against risk-based food regulation insofar as the market offers consumers 
greater freedom to shop around for safer food than to workers seeking safer employment. 
Indeed, public outrage over market failures has been a historic driver of food safety 
regulation, from the 19th-century adulteration scandals to the 2012 horse meat scandal, when 
the Environment Minister, previously a great supporter of deregulation, leaned on the FSA to 
require “that all producers and retailers test all their processed beef products for the presence 
of horsemeat” regardless of risk (Patterson, 2013).
In addition, the food politics agenda over the last thirty years has been shaped by a 
complex set of alignments between consumer, producer, processor and retail interests that 
have tended to favour the legal status quo. For example, the sensitivity of supermarkets to 
consumer group campaigns has not disposed them to champion explicit cost–benefit trade-
offs, or to appeal against court judgments on those grounds. Indeed, stringent regulation has 
provided rent-seeking opportunities for large food manufacturers and processors who can 
more readily absorb regulatory costs than their smaller competitors. Consequently, while 
the BSE crisis prompted substantial reforms to the institutional structures of food safety 
regulation, it did not open up questions about the regime’s basic legal goals comparable with 
Robens’s redefinition of the goals of OHS regulation (Howard, 2004).
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Moreover, that complex constellation of interest groups has made for a pluralist, rather 
than corporatist, regulatory setting within which no actors have sufficient legitimacy to make 
risk-benefit trade-offs on behalf of wider constituencies. For example, when the FSA’s own 
Consumer Committee claimed a mandate to speak for consumers and openly challenged 
the board’s decision making in the mid-2000s, it was promptly abolished and replaced by 
an Advisory Committee on Consumer Engagement with a more limited remit (Rothstein, 
2013). In that context, the FSA has had to work hard to gain support for using risk as a 
basis for setting regulatory rules. In 2005, for example, the FSA had to conduct an extensive 
consultation before relaxing a BSE-related ban on cattle over thirty months entering the food 
chain, which had delivered only a very small safety gain at great cost (Royal Society, 2005). 
Such risk-based decisions have consequently tended to be the exception rather than the rule.
4.3 Europeanization and global governance mandates
Another factor often driving policy transfers is international governance institutions like 
the WTO and EU. Europeanization, for example, is often cited as a major driver of risk 
regulation in member states (Majone, 2003; Orru and Rothstein, 2015), and differences here 
might explain the uneven transfer and application of risk-based approaches within OHS and 
food safety regulation. There is substantial EU regulation in both domains, but it has tended 
either to reinforce established regulatory principles or to be successfully resisted when it 
challenges them.
In OHS there was no appetite for a European OHS regime at the time SFAIRP was 
established in UK law in 1974, just a year after the UK joined the EEC. That changed, 
however, when the 1989 OHS Framework Directive (89/391/EEC) was introduced to meet 
the 1986 Single European Act’s aim of creating a level regulatory playing-field. Among the 
Directive’s broad requirements was one for risk assessment. While risk assessment had not 
been an explicit employer duty under UK law, its long-established use to meet the demands 
of SFAIRP meant that the Directive served merely to formalize that practice. A more radical 
implication of the Directive, however, was successfully resisted. Despite its enthusiasm 
for assessing risk in the workplace, the European Commission tried to overturn SFAIRP as 
inconsistent with the safety-oriented requirement of Article 5(1) to “ensure the safety and 
health of workers in every aspect related to the work”. After years of wrangling, however, the 
European Court of Justice found in favour of the UK (C-127/05, Commission v. UK [2007] 
ECR I-4619), and the principle has remained core to UK law (Rothstein et al, 2005).
In food safety, Europeanization has also reinforced preexisting regulatory principles and 
practices, rather than introducing new ones. The EU has issued a host of requirements for risk 
assessment and HACCP along with many other rules on the composition, contamination, and 
handling of food. But this raft of EU Regulations, which is “aimed at guaranteeing that unsafe 
food is not placed on the market” (178/2002, recital 10), goes with the grain of the UK’s 
long-standing legal principle that food offered for sale should not be ‘injurious to health’.
The EU has similarly done very little to alter the principles of regulatory inspection 
and enforcement in either regime; regulatory competences that are traditionally derogated 
to member states. Thus, although the European Commission’s Strategy on OHS highlights 
“serious shortcomings in the application of Community legislation”, it says little about 
inspection and enforcement, beyond urging member states to do more “to ensure that those 
concerned meet their obligations” (CEC, 2007, pages 5, 7). The EU has unusually played a 
more active role in food safety, but it has tended to reinforce existing practices. Regulation 
882/2004 requires risk-based food safety inspection, but this has merely reinforced the long-
standing commitment of LA inspectorates to risk-based priority-planning schemes. Likewise, 
decades-old EU rules (currently Regulation 853/2004) requiring certified veterinarians to 
supervise the inspection of every animal carcass by a meat hygiene inspector for a long 
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checklist of hazards, have reinforced the UK’s longstanding approach to inspection of that 
domain. While the FSA supports current EU moves to reform meat inspection, the extent of 
that reform has yet to be agreed.
4.4 Professional cultures, institutional pressures, and blame avoidance
One final set of explanations for the striking differences between OHS and food safety 
regulation concerns the cultures and imperatives of regulators themselves. The public-choice 
literature, for example, suggests that bureaucrats act in ways that advance their organizations’ 
or their own interests by maximizing budgets or by avoiding stressful or unpleasant work 
(Dunleavy, 1991). Others have pointed to the way in which bureaucrats advance their 
professional world views through their advocacy of different approaches to policy (Downs, 
1967), or are motivated by blame-avoidance imperatives (Hood et al, 2001). Such factors 
may go some way towards explaining some final puzzles.
In OHS, risk-based approaches to regulation have been favoured by the structure and 
culture of the regime. Born through consolidation of various sectoral inspectorates, the HSE 
is dominated by a professionalized cadre of expert inspectors with deep knowledge of the 
workplaces they inspect. Circulation between the inspectorate and policy staff is encouraged 
at the HSE, and this mobility has ensured close coordination between regulatory policy-
making and enforcement. A common professional background and culture also facilitated 
the rapid transfer of risk-based approaches from the HSE to LA inspectors. As one senior 
inspector commented, risk-based approaches are good for “justifying why we are going 
where are going”, both to regulatees demanding a lighter touch and to unions concerned 
about safety.
Risk-based rationales have also served OHS regulators in other ways, such as deflecting 
blame for failures to prevent workplace tragedies. After twenty-three Chinese cockle-pickers 
were drowned in Morecombe Bay in 2004, for example, the HSE revised its guidance and 
beefed-up enforcement, but an HSE spokesman also observed that with a “huge coastline … it 
was impossible to be wholly sure that the tragedy would not reoccur … . You can’t eliminate 
risk, life is full of risk” (Lancashire Evening Post 2004). Risk-based rationales have also 
helped OHS regulators respond to budget cuts and deregulatory pressures from government. 
While Coalition government ministers trumpeted their proposals for a further one-third 
reduction in the number of HSE and LA inspections and a complete ban on routine inspections 
on ‘nonmajor hazard’ industries as “reducing unnecessary red tape”, the HSE chief executive 
emphasized how “even better targeting of our activities … will enable us to give the highest 
level of attention to those areas with the potential to cause the most harm” (DWP, 2011). 
Tombs and Whyte (2010; 2013) complain, with some justice, that risk-based rationales are 
being used to legitimate deregulation of OHS, but with many Conservatives determined to 
dismantle the entire regime, it might also be argued that risk-based regulatory rationales have 
enabled the HSE to fend off even more draconian cuts.
In food safety regulation, by contrast, structural fragmentation has slowed and promoted 
the uneven diffusion of risk-based approaches across the regime. While the FSA (2006, 
paragraph 2.35) aspires “always to be risk-based and proportionate”, it has limited scope 
for doing so, because most food safety regulations are set in Brussels and food law demands 
safety. Within the FSA, risk-based policy making has also been inhibited by Whitehall’s 
generalist civil-service tradition. When the FSA was formed, it brought together staff from 
MAFF and the Department of Health, who had generalist policy-making skills but little 
frontline technical experience of assessing and managing food safety risks. Although the 
FSA has appointed more staff with food backgrounds, it still relies heavily on external expert 
committees for advice and has little feel for what one FSA official described to us as the 
“sharp end” of food safety enforcement. According to LA interviewees, the FSA guidance is 
Mobilizing risk 385
sometimes disregarded as “impractical”, and even the FSA’s (2012b) own Capability Review 
argued that the agency should develop “greater understanding of the challenges that local 
authorities currently face” in enforcing FSA policies.
The adoption of risk-based approaches to food safety inspection and enforcement has 
been less halting but still uneven. Staffed by environmental health experts, LA inspectorates 
began adopting these approaches in the late 1980s because it suited their need to prioritize 
scarce inspection resources and reinforced their long-standing emphasis on case-by-case 
assessment and sanctioning of noncompliance (Hawkins, 2002). By contrast, meat hygiene 
inspection has been slow to follow suit. This has largely been because vets were able to 
use their influence in MAFF, the Meat Hygiene Service, and member states to preserve the 
long-standing requirement that they inspect every animal at slaughter, irrespective of risk.
Institutional fragmentation between policy and enforcement also shaped how risk-based 
priority-planning systems for food safety inspection diffused through the regime. Rather 
than being passed down to LAs by ministerial diktat or, as in OHS, as a recommendation 
from an official review (Robens, 1972, paragraph 218), priority-planning in food safety 
emerged from the bottom-up, out of the overlapping professional cultures of OHS and food 
safety inspection. Many LA inspectors have responsibilities for both domains and saw the 
value of OHS priority-planning systems for managing budgetary constraints and fending off 
complaints from regulatees. Those LA practices of priority-planning were then transmitted 
‘upwards’ to the Department of Health (DoH, 1996), which incorporated them into the first 
national codes of practice, and for which the FSA is now responsible.
As ideas of risk-based food safety inspection were mobilized to become national policy, 
their meanings shifted as well. LAs have long framed risk-based systems as resource 
allocation tools for targeting scarce inspection resources on those businesses judged to need 
the most oversight. By contrast, risk-based food safety inspection was cited by the Hampton 
(2005) Review as a lesson in how to reduce regulatory burdens on business, prompting a 
statutory requirement for all regulatory inspectorates to follow suit (BERR, 2007). For the 
FSA (2012a, pages 6, 13), meanwhile, risk-based approaches promise to “improve business 
compliance and consumer health protection”, while at the same time advancing the UK 
government’s business-friendly “priorities around removing regulatory burdens”.
The contrasting patterns of top-down and bottom-up transfer of risk-based inspection in 
OHS and food safety also reflect the institutional politics of responsibility and blame in the 
two domains. Unlike OHS, where risk-based approaches help limit the HSE’s liability for 
enforcement failures, in food safety, the FSA is under less pressure to follow suit because 
greater fragmentation in the regime leaves it more scope for ‘delegating’ blame for food safety 
failures (Hood et al, 2001), either onto duty holders or the LAs responsible for ensuring their 
compliance. Such blame shifting is common across government in similar structural contexts 
where policies can be made to suit the interests of central government departments without 
regard for the difficulties of implementation by LAs and other ‘delivery bodies’ (Porter and 
Demeritt, 2012; Rothstein and Downer, 2012). Indeed, while the HSE tends to be under 
pressure from ministers to do less, and so is looking for a way of rationalizing lessened 
controls, the FSA is more likely, in the spotlight of public opinion, to be under pressure 
from ministers to ‘do more’, such as increased testing in the wake of the horse meat scandal 
(Patterson, 2013). These pressures tend to undermine the FSA’s ability to enact the risk-based 
approaches to which it is otherwise so committed.
5 Conclusions
This paper has explored the factors shaping the uneven development, transfer, and application 
of risk-based approaches to regulating OHS and food safety in the UK. In OHS, risk ideas 
underpin both the regulatory goal of balancing the benefit and costs of protecting workers 
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as well as the tools used by the HSE and LAs for regulatory inspection and enforcement. 
Yet in food, despite the proliferation of risk rhetoric from the FSA, British ministers, and 
EFSA, UK food safety law remains committed to its 19th-century, and EU-reinforced, goal 
of ensuring food is safe to eat. Food safety inspection and enforcement, however, have—with 
the exception of meat hygiene—been more receptive to risk-based practices. LAs adapted 
OHS risk-based priority-planning systems and those practices then diffused upwards to 
become national policy for food safety inspection, which then, through Hampton, provided a 
model for all regulatory inspection in the UK.
The complexity and unevenness of these policy transfers challenge arguments that suggest 
risk-based regulation reflects either a coherent Anglo-Saxon style of regulation (Rothstein 
et al, 2013) or the globalizing forces of neoliberalization (Gray, 2009). Our analysis of the 
contrast between the much greater levels of risk-based isomorphism in regulatory inspection 
relative to regulatory goal-setting highlights the complexity and varied receptiveness of 
different regulatory functions to risk ideas and instruments. This variety has received little 
attention hitherto in the regulation literature.
Local context and embedded path dependencies are clearly important in shaping the 
movement of risk-based approaches across regime functions. But beyond highlighting 
the influence of contextual factors, or merely concluding that “[m]ore detailed empirical 
research is needed” to explain the mobility of risk ideas and instruments (Temenos and 
McCann, 2013, page 351), our fine-grained comparative approach provides a framework for 
offering some more general reflections on the drivers of such policy transfers.
Contrary to claims about risk as a neoliberalizing logic for eroding regulatory protections, 
there is little evidence that such pressures have altered regulatory goal-setting in either 
of our cases. OHS adopted the risk-based regulatory goal of SFAIRP at the impetus of 
Robens (1972), substantially before the regulatory roll-backs of the Thatcher era. Robens 
looked to risk as a universal principle for extending the reach of regulation rather than—
as neoliberalization theorists often suggest—reducing its protections (Gray, 2009; James 
et al, 2013; Tombs and Whyte, 2010; 2013). Calls from neoliberal ideologues to deregulate 
OHS have been repeatedly rebuffed by both industry and labour representatives who support 
existing corporatist arrangements for striking explicitly risk-based trade-offs in OHS.
Likewise, despite pressures from the WTO, the Europeanization of food safety regulation 
has reinforced rather than eroded the long-standing legal duty on businesses to ensure that 
the food they sell is not injurious to health. Changing such legal duties is difficult, given the 
multiple legislative veto-points at both national and EU levels, and there is little evidence 
of any explicit pressure for risk-based qualification of those absolute duties amongst those 
groups that might be expected to benefit. If EU regulation tends to be more precautionary in its 
goals than the US, our analysis suggests that it may result less from any overarching political 
shift—as, for example, Vogel (2012) claims—than from sector-specific path dependencies.
Unlike regulatory goal-setting, inspection and enforcement are executive functions 
for which legislative consent is less important and where, as a result, there may be more 
sensitivity to top-down and external pressures to adopt risk-based approaches. As part of an 
increasingly coercive programme of “risk-tolerant de-regulation” (Dodds, 2006), the UK 
central government has now mandated the use of risk-based inspection across all regulatory 
domains (BERR, 2007). In many ways, however, our two cases are exceptions to this pattern 
of coercive policy transfer. Nor do we find much evidence for the emphasis sometimes 
given to private consultants and other ‘traveling technocrats’ in spreading policy instruments 
(Larner and Laurie, 2010). Instead, risk-based priority-planning of inspections spread through 
shared professional networks from the HSE to LA inspectorates who voluntarily adapted 
them for OHS in the 1980s and later for food safety in the 1990s. Their spread across these 
domains reflected shared professional concerns with proportionality, resource prioritization, 
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and blame deflection. As such, not only did the adoption of risk-based inspection and 
enforcement approaches in OHS and food safety predate statutory requirements for such 
practices, our two cases provided the model for the later imposition of those requirements by 
central government.
However, as risk-based approaches to inspection moved ‘up’ the institutional hierarchy, 
the rationales for them shifted as well. Whereas LA inspectorates were attracted to risk-
based approaches as a means of allocating scarce inspection resources, central government 
seized on risk-based rationales as a means of reducing administrative burdens on business. 
EFSA (2013) is now tentatively exploring such approaches as a means of improving the 
effectiveness of food safety controls across Europe. Indeed, it is precisely this mutability in 
the rationales for risk-based approaches that makes them potentially so mobile (Demeritt and 
Nobert, 2011).
While business and political leaders have often endorsed risk-based regulation as a part 
of a wider effort to reduce costs and roll back state regulation, our paper has shown that 
its adoption depends crucially upon the configuration of interest groups as much as their 
power and proclivities. The tripartitite structure of OHS regulation in the UK has provided a 
supportive environment for a narrow set of sectoral interest group representatives to negotiate 
risk–cost trade-offs. This is not possible in food regulation where the number and variety 
of competing interests make reaching explicit bargains over acceptable levels of risk more 
difficult.
Likewise, regulatory architecture is also important because it shapes accountability 
structures and thus the appetite for risk-based approaches among regulators. With 
responsibility both for setting regulations and enforcing them, the HSE has a strong incentive 
to adopt risk-based approaches to focus control efforts on the highest priority risks rather than 
promising to prevent all possible harms. By contrast, in food safety, regulatory goal-setting 
and enforcement are institutionally distinct, which encourages divergence in the uptake of 
risk-based approaches. Food law has long aimed for safety without regard for cost and the 
marginal benefits of additional controls, while regulatory policies devised by the FSA and 
European Commission have not always considered the practical difficulties of implementing 
them. When things go wrong, problems are then attributed to failures by others to meet 
regulatory requirements. By contrast, with the exception of meat hygiene inspection, LA 
inspectorates have long used risk-based approaches to delimit what they can reasonably be 
expected to achieve with their scarce enforcement resources and thereby protect themselves 
from blame in the event of compliance failures.
From this analysis it is possible to distil a set of institutional variables shaping the 
transfer and application of risk-based regulation, including historic path dependencies and 
regulatory crises; interest group power and configuration; legal tradition and international 
mandate; accountability structures; and professional group proclivities. On this basis we 
might predict, for example, that regulatory architectures with concentrated policy making 
and implementation responsibilities will face increased accountability pressures and thus see 
a greater appetite among regulators for risk-based approaches to help them deflect blame for 
adverse outcomes. Transfers in such contexts are more likely to find a receptive audience 
actively seeking opportunities for reform. However, the scope for regulators to adopt such 
approaches will also depend on the interaction of other factors highlighted in this paper, 
such as their consistency with preexisting legal duties and the potential to secure consensus 
for any risk trade-offs among key stakeholder groups. Although our two cases did not concern 
the transfer of risk-based approaches through top-down mandate, there is no reason to expect 
coercive transfers to be immune from these constraints. While food safety and OHS have 
become the paradigmatic cases used by Hampton (2005) and BERR (2007) to legitimate the 
transfer of risk-based approaches to all other regulatory domains in Britain through top-down 
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mandate, the unevenness of their transfer across these two regimes gives reason to expect 
similar unevenness in other cases.
Acknowledgements. This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(No. ES/K006169/1). We would also like to thank the practitioners interviewed for this research for 
their valuable help, though the views expressed in this paper are of course the authors’ own.
References
Barber J, 2002 Health and Safety in Construction: Guidance for Construction Professionals 
(Institute of Civil Engineers, London)
Benson D, Jordan A, 2011, “What have we learned from policy transfer research? Dolowitz and 
Marsh revisited” Political Studies Review 9 366–378
BERR, 2007 Regulators’ Compliance Code: A Statutory Code of Practice for Regulators Department 
for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, London
BRC, 2006, “Risk, responsibility and regulation—whose risk is it anyway?”, Better Regulation 
Commission, London
Breyer S G, 1993 Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA)
Brown G, 2006, “Speech by the Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown, MP to the CBI President’s Dinner 5 June 
2006”,  
http://www.gov-news.org/gov/uk/news/speech_by_rt_hon_gordon_brown_mp_cbi_
president39s/63884.html
Cabinet Office, 2002, “Risk: improving the government’s capability to handle risk and uncertainty”, 
Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office, London
Castree N, 2005, “The epistemology of particulars: Human geography, case studies and ‘context’ ” 
Geoforum 36 541–544
CEC, 2007, “Improving quality and productivity at work: Community strategy 2007–2012 on health 
and safety at work”, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels
Connolly J, 2008, “Europeanization, uploading and downloading: the case of Defra and avian 
influenza” Public Policy and Administration 23 7–25
CPS, 2013 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 7th edition, Crown Prosecution Service, London
de Jong M, 2009, “Rose’s ‘10 steps’: why process messiness, history and culture are not vague and 
banal” Policy and Politics 37 145–150
Demeritt D, Nobert S, 2011, “Responding to early flood warning in the European Union”, in 
Forecasting, Warning, and Transnational Risks: Is Prevention Possible? Eds C O Meyer,  
C de Franco (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hants), pp 127–147
DiMaggio P J, Powell W W, 1983, “The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields” American Sociological Review 48 147–160
Dodds A, 2006, “The core executive’s approach to regulation: from ‘better regulation’ to ‘risk-tolerant 
deregulation’ ” Social Policy and Administration 40 526–542
DoH, 1996, “Code of practice No. 8 on food standards inspections (second revision)”, Department of 
Health and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, London
Dolowitz D, Marsh D, 1996, “Who learns what from whom: a review of the policy transfer 
literature” Political Studies 44 343–357
Dolowitz D P, Marsh D, 2000, “Learning from abroad: the role of policy transfer in contemporary 
policy-making” Governance 13 5–23
Downs A, 1967 Inside Bureaucracy (Little Brown, Boston, MA)
Dunleavy P, 1991 Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political 
Science (Harvester Wheatsheaf, London)
DWP, 2011, “Press release: reforming Britain’s health and safety regime to put common sense back”, 
21 March, Department for Work and Pensions,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/reforming-britain-s-health-and-safety-regime-to-put-common-
sense-back
EFSA, 2013, “Press release: meat inspection: European Food Safety Authority completes review of 
practices and recommends improvements”, European Food Safety Authority,  
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/130627a.htm
Mobilizing risk 389
European Commission, 2009, “Food hygiene”,  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/food_safety/veterinary_checks_and_food_hygiene/f84001_
en.htm
Fairman R, 2007, “What makes tolerability of risk work? Exploring the limitations of its applicability 
to other risk fields”, in The Tolerability of Risk: A New Framework for Risk Management  
Eds F Bouder, R E Lofstedt, D Slavin (Earthscan, London), pp 119–138
FSA, Food Standards Agency, London
2006, “Annual Report, 2005/06”
2009, “Future meat controls—programme to deliver more risk-based proportionate controls”
2011, “Annual Report and Consolidated Accounts 2010/11”
2012a, “Compliance and Enforcement Strategy for 2010–15”
2012b, “Capability Review”
Gray G C, 2009, “The responsibilization strategy of health and safety: neo-liberalism and the 
reconfiguration of individual responsibility for risk” British Journal of Criminology 49 326–342
Gruszczynski L, 2010 Regulating Health and Environmental Risks Under WTO Law: A Critical 
Analysis of the SPS Agreement (Oxford University Press, Oxford)
Hampton P, 2005 Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and Enforcement HM 
Treasury, London
Hawkins K, 2002 Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford)
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 Public General Acts—Elizabeth II chapter 37 (HMSO, 
London)
Hennock E P, 2007 The Origin of the Welfare State in England and Germany, 1850–1914: Social 
Policies Compared (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
HM Government, 2010 The Coalition: Our Programme for Government Cabinet Office, London
Hood C, Rothstein H, Baldwin R, 2001 The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation 
Regimes (Oxford University Press, Oxford)
Howard, M, 2004, “Food hygiene regulation and enforcement policy in the UK: the underlying 
philosophy and comparisons with occupational health and safety law” Food Service Technology 
4(2) 69–73
HSE, 1988, “The tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations”, Health and Safety Executive, 
London
HSE, 2009, “Enforcement policy statement”, Health and Safety Executive, Bootle
HSE, 2013, “United Kingdom Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (UK-ILGRA)”, 
Health and Safety Executive, http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/committees/ilgra/
Huber M, Rothstein H, 2013, “The risk organisation: or how organisations reconcile themselves to 
failure” Journal of Risk Research 16 651–675
Hutter B M, 2011 Managing Food Safety and Hygiene: Governance and Regulation as Risk 
Management (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Glos)
James O, Lodge M, 2003, “The limitations of ‘policy transfer’ and ‘lesson drawing’ for public policy 
research” Political Studies Review 1 179–193
James P, 1997, “Food Standards Agency Report—an interim proposal”, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, http://archive.food.gov.uk/maff/archive/food/james/cont.htm
James P, Tombs S, Whyte D, 2013, “An independent review of British health and safety regulation? 
From common sense to non-sense” Policy Studies 34 36–52
Kingdon J W, 1984 Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Little Brown, Boston, MA)
Knill C, 2001 The Europeanisation of National Administrations: Patterns of Institutional Change 
and Persistence (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
Lancashire Evening Post 2004, “We can never prevent another Bay disaster”,  
http://www.lep.co.uk/news/local/we-can-never-prevent-another-bay-disaster-1-140999
Larner W, Laurie N, 2010, “Travelling technocrats, embodied knowledges: globalising privatisation 
in telecoms and water” Geoforum 41 218–226
Lofstedt R, 2011 Reclaiming Health and Safety for All: An Independent Review of Health and Safety 
Legislation (Stationery Office, London)
390 D Demeritt, H Rothstein, A-L Beaussier, M Howard
McCann E, 2011, “Urban policy mobilities and global circuits of knowledge: toward a research 
agenda” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 101 107–130
McCann E, Ward K, 2012, “Policy assemblages, mobilities and mutations: toward a 
multidisciplinary conversation” Political Studies Review 10 325–332
McCann E, Ward K, 2013, “A multi-disciplinary approach to policy transfer research: geographies, 
assemblages, mobilities and mutations” Policy Studies 34 2–18
Majone G (Ed.), 2003 Risk Regulation in the European Union: Between Enlargement and 
Internationalization (European University Institute, Florence)
OECD, 2010 Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance of Risk (OECD Publishing, 
Paris)
Orru K, Rothstein H, 2015, “Not ‘dead letters’, just ‘blind eyes’: the Europeanisation of drinking 
water safety regulation in Estonia and Lithuania” Environment and Planning A 47 ...–...
Patterson O, 2013, “Oral statement to the House on food fraud. 10 February”,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/oral-statement-to-the-house-on-food-fraud
Peck J, 2011, “Geographies of policy: from transfer-diffusion to mobility-mutation” Progress in 
Human Geography 35 773–797
Peck J, Theodore N, 2001, “Exporting workfare/importing welfare-to-work: exploring the politics of 
Third Way policy transfer” Political Geography 20 427–460
Peck J, Theodore N, 2012, “Follow the policy: a distended case approach” Environment and 
Planning A 44 21–30
Phillips Lord, Bridgeman J, Ferguson-Smith M, 2000 The BSE Inquiry: The Report (The Stationery 
Office, London)
Porter J, Demeritt D, 2012, “Flood-risk management, mapping, and planning: the institutional 
politics of decision support in England” Environment and Planning A 44 2359–2378
Robens A, 1972 Safety and Health at Work (HMSO, London)
Rose R, 1993 Lesson-drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space 
(Chatham House Publishers, Chatham, NJ)
Rothstein H, 2013, “Domesticating participation: participation and the institutional rationalities of 
science-based policy-making in the UK Food Standards Agency” Journal of Risk Research  
16 771–790
Rothstein H, Downer J, 2012, “ ‘Renewing Defra’: exploring the emergence of risk-based 
policymaking in UK central government” Public Administration 90 781–799
Rothstein H, Borraz O, Huber M, 2013, “Risk and the limits of governance: exploring varied 
patterns of risk-based governance across Europe” Regulation and Governance 7 215–235
Rothstein H R, Beaussier A-L, Borraz O, Bouder F, Demeritt D, de Haan M, Huber M, Paul R, 
Wesseling M, 2015, “When ‘must’ means ‘maybe’: varieties of risk regulation and the problem 
of trade-offs in Europe”, HowSAFE WP 1, 15 January,  
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/geography/research/hrg/projects/howsafe/Rothstein-et-al-
2015-Varieties-of-Risk-Regulation-in-Europe-10-01--2015.pdf
Royal Society, 2005, “Social science insights for risk assessment”, Royal Society, London
Sheller M, Urry J, 2006, “The new mobilities paradigm” Environment and Planning A 38 207–226
Stone D, 1999, “Learning lessons and transferring policy across time, space and disciplines” Politics 
19 51–59
Stone D, 2000, “Non-governmental policy transfer: the strategies of independent policy institutes” 
Governance 13 45–70
Temenos C, McCann E, 2013, “Geographies of policy mobilities” Geography Compass 7 344–357
Temple M, 2014, “Triennial Review Report: Health and Safety Executive. An independent review 
of the function, form and governance of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Summary of 
Evidence”, Department of Work and Pensions, London
Thelen K, 1999, “Historical institutionalism in comparative politics” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2 369–404
Tombs S, Whyte D, 2010, “A deadly consensus: worker safety and regulatory degradation under 
New Labour” British Journal of Criminology 50(1) 46–65
Tombs S, Whyte D, 2013, “Transcending the deregulation debate? Regulation, risk, and the 
enforcement of health and safety law in the UK” Regulation and Governance 7 61–79
Mobilizing risk 391
Vogel D, 2012 The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in 
Europe and the United States (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ)
Walker J L, 1969, “The diffusion of innovations among the American states” American Political 
Science Review 63 880–899
Walters D, Johnstone R, Frick K, Quinian M, Baril-Gingras G, Thebaud-Mony A, 2011 Regulating 
Workplace Risks: A Comparative Study of Inspection Regimes in Times of Change (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, Glos)
Van Zwanenberg P, Millstone,E, 2005 BSE: Risk, Science, and Governance (Oxford University 
Press, New York)
